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Abstract
This paper seeks to reinvigorate the theory of regime politics in the judiciary among legal
scholars, taking into account the critiques offered. The paper reviews the extant literature on
regime politics, including its origins, before examining the criticisms this approach engendered.
The valid concerns highlight the limited development of regime politics as a theory, despite the
empirical work conducted in this tradition. This paper aims to address that shortcoming,
explicitly identifying the underlying assumptions of regime politics theory and then developing
testable hypotheses based on those assumptions.
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Reinvigorating Regime Politics

The theory of regime politics among law and courts scholars can trace its origins back to
Dahl’s (1957) article on the Supreme Court’s close connection to the governing coalition. In the
article, Dahl argues that the Court is rarely out of line with the preferences of popular majorities,
suggesting that concerns about a “countermajoritarian difficulty” (Bickel 1962) are unnecessary.
Dahl’s argument about the Court’s connection to popular preferences was picked up and
expanded on by numerous subsequent scholars, generating in particular a wave of work in the
1990s and early 2000s that sought to advance a theory of regime politics in the judiciary (Graber
1993; Clayton and May 1999; Gillman 2002; Pickerill and Clayton 2004; Whittington 2005,
2007). This work fit well with the rise of new institutionalism in the study of courts, seeking to
contextualize the actions of courts within their larger political environment. By 2007, though,
serious criticisms of regime politics began to emerge. Keck (2007a, 2007b) in particular raised
concerns about the relatively loose way in which regime politics was conceptualized in this
work. Hall (2012) found that predictions about the exercise of judicial review generated by
regime politics did not match the Court’s observed behavior.
Even these critiques, though, acknowledge that regime politics as an approach offers a
potentially persuasive and powerful way to understand the actions of the judiciary (Hall 2012,
900; Keck 2007b, 540). The call for a more rigorous and nuanced theory of regime politics has
largely gone unaddressed, however. Hall and his coauthors, for example, continue to offer
empirical insight into the operation of regime politics and judicial review (2012; Hall and Black
2013; Hall and Ura 2015), but do not themselves seek to reformulate regime politics theory. The
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purpose of this article is to develop a testable theory of regime politics that accounts for the
criticisms raised while still incorporating the central insights of past work.
One of the important steps in doing so is to expand the inquiry beyond judicial review as
exercised by the U.S. Supreme Court. Though the bulk of the literature is focused on the
Supreme Court, the entire judiciary in the United States is worthy of study and the relationship
between regimes and courts at all levels ought to be of interest to political scientists. In many
ways, as I will establish, the Supreme Court declaring laws unconstitutional are circumstances in
which regime influence will be the most inconsistent. Is it possible, then, to develop a theory of
regime politics that can be applied to courts of all levels (and indeed all countries) that does not
devolve into generalizations that become ultimately useless? One that is open to the varied
methodological traditions within the discipline of political science? That is the task this article
takes up.
Doing so does not take place in a vacuum, but in the context of a theoretically rich
tradition of the study of courts. I will draw on extant literature to specify the premises of the
theory of regime politics before moving on to generate a set of testable hypotheses. I then offer
an initial test of these hypotheses through two brief qualitative case studies. Though preliminary,
this revised theory of regime politics is one which accounts for the criticisms and limitations of
existing work while providing a clear direction forward for developing greater insight into the
ways in which the judiciary is embedded within the larger political system.

The Development of Regime Politics
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Dahl (1957) is the typical starting point for understanding the theory of regime politics.
Rejecting the dominant concern among legal scholars about countermajoritarianism in the
judiciary, Dahl makes the claim that the actions of the Supreme Court are rarely out of alignment
with popular preferences for long. This is a result, he argues, of the relatively frequent
replacement of justices on the Court by presidents. “[T]he policy views dominant on the Court
are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of
the Unites States. Consequently it would be most unrealistic to suppose that the Court would, for
more than a few years at most, stand against any major alternatives sought by a lawmaking
majority” (Dahl 1957, 285).
From this, we can see the initial outlines of an understanding of the relationship between
the Supreme Court and the other branches of government. The appointment power means that
the dominant lawmaking majority will, over time, bring the membership of the Supreme Court
into ideological alignment with their views. Dahl tests this claim by looking at how soon after
enactment federal laws were declared unconstitutional. Almost half were declared
unconstitutional more than four years after passage, with the bulk of those decided in less time
coming during the New Deal. This approach sets up both the strengths and the weaknesses of
the subsequent theory. The connection between the elected branches and the Court relies on
fairly uncontroversial assumptions about the behavior of both politicians and judges. Dahl
makes reference to the “legitimacy powers” of the Court that are at stake when acting contrary to
the preferences of the current lawmaking majority (1957, 294). At the same time, the test of the
theory offered by Dahl is only roughly sketched out and leaves many remaining questions about
the conditions under which the Court will act against the lawmaking majority. Lawmaking
majorities, for example, are short-lived for Dahl and don’t consider how longer term control of
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government might shift the conclusions. From these initial insights, the theory of regime politics
in the judiciary emerges.
Though Dahl’s insight can be seen in the work of scholars such as McCloskey (1960) and
Shapiro (1964), the theory of regime politics received more careful treatment beginning in the
1990s as new institutionalism offered a competing paradigm to the dominant behavioralism.
Graber’s 1993 article critiquing the countermajoritarian literature is often identified as the
beginning of this trend. He was not interested in individual decision-making, but rather the
institutional influences on the Court. Graber argues that legislative majorities can actually
welcome and even invite judicial review by the Supreme Court. “Historically, the justices have
most often exercised their power to declare state and federal practices unconstitutional only
when the dominant national coalition is unable or unwilling to settle some public
dispute…prominent elected officials consciously invite the judiciary to resolve those political
controversies that they cannot or would rather not address” (Graber 1993, 36). This points to
relevant majorities that extend over longer periods of time than the four years to which Dahl
referred, but it remains only loosely specified.
Regime politics, as a theory, received some of its most careful consideration in Clayton
and May (1999). Clayton and May offer regime politics as an approach that can unite new
institutionalists of varying approaches. The “political regimes” approach, as they call it,
“suggests that judicial attitudes and strategies in decision making are both constituted and
constrained by the broader context within which the Court operates” (Clayton and May 1999,
234). Central to this theory is the notion that what “the law” means to different justices is a
function of the views of the relevant institutionalized actors who selected them and constrain or
support their ability to act. They are careful, though, to avoid the conclusion that “judges are
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deciding cases on the basis of personal policy preferences or strategic calculations about their
power relative to the other branches” (Clayton and May 1999, 244–45). They leave open the
possibility that judges might sincerely be attempting to interpret the law, while still being
responsive to the values of a political regime. This political regimes approach calls for focusing
analysis on “how these institutions are related to the values embedded in the political regime by
examining the articulation of legal positions in elections, party platforms, the judicial selection
process, case disposition in lower courts, or the positions taken by the solicitor general, members
of Congress, state governments or interest groups in direct litigation” (Clayton and May 1999,
248). Like those before them, though, the concept of political regime itself remains unclear and
largely unexamined. When does a regime begin and how can we tell when it ends? How
cohesive do political actors need to be in order to constitute a “regime?”
A spate of work incorporating a regime politics approach followed. In 2002, Gillman
examined the ways in which political parties, particularly those that might be characterized as
regimes due to the longevity of their control, actively and consciously sought to remake the
federal judiciary in ways that would advance their long-term goals. He concludes with a call to
“locate the scope and direction of judicial decision making into a broader analysis of party
systems and partisan control of those institutions that are responsible for the jurisdiction and
staffing of courts” (Gillman 2002, 522). Lovell (2003) explored the ways in which Congress
uses statutory ambiguity or legislative deferrals to pass the responsibility for decisions on to the
judiciary. This understanding calls for greater attention to the subtle ways in which Congress
interacts with the judiciary. Pickerill and Clayton (2004; see also Clayton and Pickerill 2006;
Whittington 2001) argue that the Rehnquist Court’s decisions in federalism cases can best be
understood through the lens of regime politics, highlighting the emphasis on federalism among
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the Republican coalition for decades prior to the explosion of federalism decisions in the 1990s.
This emphasis played an important role in the selection of nominees as well as the organization
of interest groups bringing legislation. From a theoretical standpoint, Pickerill and Clayton build
on the critical election literature of political science and the constitutional order literature of the
legal academy (2004, 241). Both focus on regimes that may be dominant for generations, but
Pickerill and Clayton note that during periods of less regime stability, conflicting values and
greater deference to the judiciary may very well occur (2004, 242).
Whittington (2005, 2007) adopted a similar approach in examining the connection
between regime power and the judiciary. Where Gillman (2002) focused on how regimes might
strengthen the courts in order to continue their power after electoral defeat, Whittington explores
the incentives to expand judicial authority even while still in control. The ability of courts to
overcome obstructions faced by regimes encourages judicial supremacy through what
Whittington calls “friendly judicial activism” (2005, 594). As with the earlier work, Whittington
draws connections between the judicial review of the Supreme Court and the political branches
that enable and, indeed, empower the Court.

Critiques Emerge
As the regime politics approach gained more traction within the discipline of political
science and began to spread to the legal academy as well, some notes of caution were sounded.
Most prominently, Keck (2007a, 2007b) raised serious concerns about the potential for overreach
in the claims made by regime politics scholars. In particular, Keck was concerned that a regime
politics approach could obscure the very real possibility of independent action by the courts. The
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“proposition that governing coalitions dictate the results of the Court's decisions…is wrong,
because the governing coalition is so often divided on important matters that the justices will
have multiple acceptable alternatives in most cases” (Keck 2007b, 517). Keck does not suggest
that regimes do not influence judicial decisions- just that the connection to the regime is not the
only, or even the most important, relationship to consider with regard to judicial review. He
argues that the exercise of judicial review is simultaneously “a tool of partisan entrenchment, a
reflection of policy agreement, and an expression of legal principle” (Keck 2007a, 321). Failure
to attend to the conditions under which independent action occurs leaves us with an inaccurate
sense of the dependency of courts on political regimes. For Keck, the central empirical question
of regime politics ought to be “whether--or to what degree, or under what conditions--judges are
likely to act independently of the wishes of other power holders” (2007b, 540). Dynamics such
as the jurisprudential regimes of Richards and Kritzer (2002) suggest that legal evaluation and
commitments will exercise their own influence on how judges decide that reaches beyond the
narratives of attitudinalism or regime politics.
Implicit in Keck’s critique is the sense that the theory of regime politics is
underdeveloped and underspecified even as the work itself often provides nuance and
explanatory power. That is, Keck suggests that both the dependent variable (independent action
rather than regime influence) and some of the independent variables (law and jurisprudential
regimes rather than just political regimes) need to be recalibrated or at least made more explicit.
Hall’s (2012) effort to empirically test some of the claims of regime politics theory regarding
judicial review runs into a similar challenge. Hall finds four possible reasons advanced by
regime politics scholars for the exercise of judicial review- “(1) blame avoidance, (2) regime
entrenchment, (3) regime fulfillment, or (4) regime maintenance” (2012, 882). These lead to two
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circumstances in which judicial review should be more likely to occur- “when (1) the ideology of
the Court converges with that of the sitting elected branches (suggesting that the Court need not
fear sanctions or nonimplementation), and (2) the ideology of the sitting elected branches
diverges from that of the elected branches that enacted a statute (suggesting that the sitting
branches want the statute to be invalidated)” (Hall 2012, 885). Hall finds that most invalidations
by the Supreme Court do not meet these criteria, even when he relaxes some of the assumptions
about regimes, parties, and appointments (but see Hall and Ura 2015 for evidence of an effect at
the certiorari stage). Hall and Black (2013) subsequently find no relationship between the
ideological distance between the federal and state governments and the likelihood of the Court
exercising judicial review. Both of these findings point to a more countermajoritarian role for
the Court than most regime politics scholars posit. Hall notes some caution about these
conclusions. He allows that the “quantitative analysis of regime politics may involve
methodological assumptions that run counter to the approach itself,” particularly the twodimensional ideology scores used (Hall 2012, 899). But he also highlights the very real
problems this poses for a regime politics approach. Since some of the claims are, as Keck
argues, “nonfalsifiable” this creates problems for regime politics as a theory (2007b, 533).
I would raise two other concerns with the regime politics approach not previously
identified. Though referring to courts generally and occasionally making motions to suggest the
influence of regimes on lower courts, the overwhelming emphasis within the literature has been
on the United States Supreme Court. This is not surprising given the close connection between
the regime politics literature and the countermajoritarian debate about judicial review that is
likewise centered on the Supreme Court, but this obfuscates more than it clarifies. By placing
such a single-minded focus on only one legal institution, many other dynamics that may offer
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deeper insight into how courts broadly speaking are political institutions are missed. The
Supreme Court is certainly the most visible court in the United States and arguably in the world.
This visibility is going to affect the ability of the Court to act independently, both freeing it at
times and constraining it at others. The selection of justices to life terms brings its own set of
dynamics that are not universally shared in judiciaries in the United States, to say nothing of
court systems in other countries. We should expect that the variety of selection systems used for
judiciaries will have some impact on how courts interact with regimes. By focusing exclusively
on the Supreme Court, we learn more about that institution, but those lessons do not necessarily
translate more broadly. If considering the possibility of independent judicial action is important,
as Keck suggests, so too is a thorough consideration of regime politics in action at all levels of
the courts.
The second concern is the predominant focus on judicial review to the exclusion of the
other types of cases courts handle.1 While there are good reasons to explore the exercise of
judicial review, both from a democratic theory perspective and from an institutional power
perspective, declaring laws unconstitutional remains a relatively limited part of the work of the
judiciary. Even on the Supreme Court, cases involving judicial review are dwarfed in volume by
statutory interpretation cases. At the lower levels of courts, this distinction becomes even more
stark. By broadening not only the types of courts included in regime politics analysis, but also
the types of cases, regime politics can offer further insight.

1

Obviously there are prominent exceptions to this. Lovell (2003), for example, explored

statutory ambiguity rather than judicial review.
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It is worth noting that despite the concerns they raise, both Keck and Hall acknowledge
the value of a regime politics approach to studying courts. Considering regime politics draws
attention to the broader context within which courts operate and situates courts explicitly within
the political system. To do this well calls for more careful and rigorous theory development,
which builds on the work that has come before.

Revising Regime Politics
My purpose here is to offer a testable theory of regime politics that can move the
scholarship in this field forward in a fruitful way. This theory ought to be amenable to both
quantitative and qualitative approaches. It should be broad enough to apply to many different
situations without becoming so generalized that it is no longer useful in generating predictions.
And it ought to be explicit in both its assumptions and the hypotheses it generates so as to allow
for future development. This is no small task, of course, but fortunately it is not necessary to
begin from scratch. The work that has come before is hardly atheoretical and offers a
tremendously valuable starting point. Developing such a theory does, however, require making
explicit what has at times been implicit and drawing some boundaries that may well be
contested. The benefit of this is greater attention to exactly what is being studied and greater
clarity about what the findings might mean. To do this, this article will begin by developing as
explicitly as possible the predicates for the theory, most of which will likely be uncontroversial
even for those approaching the study of courts from different backgrounds. A set of testable
hypotheses will then be derived from these predicates. As noted above, particular attention will
be paid to generating hypotheses in a way that is inclusive of all levels of courts, not just the
Supreme Court and not only in the context of the United States.
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Assumptions
The theory of regime politics rests on six main assumptions. The first of these is the
notion that the judiciary is a political institution. This rejects what is practically a strawman
argument at this point that the courts are simply mechanistic legal institutions deriving outcomes
from either pure reason or higher law. This is not to suggest, though, that the law does not
matter for the judiciary, which can be an easy mistake to make. It simply asserts that decisions
made by courts take into account something beyond just “the law.” Or perhaps it would be more
accurate to say that what “the law” is, is itself a function of politics. This is a point that will be
developed at greater length shortly.
The second assumption is that selectors of judges will tend to select judges who share
their ideological position. To be clear, in order for regime politics to be a theory that offers us
insight into the judiciary, this assumption does not need to always hold. Nor does ideology need
to be the sole force in the selection of judges. Experience, reputation, and coalition-building can
all exercise a powerful influence on the selection of judges. However, the theory is built on the
assumption that most of the time, most judges share the broad ideological perspective of those
who select them, whether that be executives, legislatures, or the public. This perception is
widely accepted within political science going at least as far back as Dahl (1957). As an
assumption, it has continued to find purchase in political science, such as in the Judicial
Common Space scores developed by Epstein et al. (2007). There are certainly circumstances
when selectors misjudge the ideological commitments of those they select or intentionally
choose those whose views differ, but the theory of regime politics treats these as exceptions
rather than the norm. It is also important to recognize that the diversity of ideological views
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within the selectorate may well influence which ideological perspective judges share, a point to
which I will return shortly.
The third assumption is that judges, when faced with situations requiring interpretation
on their part, will interpret legal texts and rules in ways that are consistent with their ideological
preferences. Though this premise is drawn from the attitudinal research on judicial decision
making that emphasizes the role of ideology (e.g. Segal and Spaeth 2002), the assumption here
should not be read as arguing that law never matters or that ideology is the only relevant
variable. Indeed, as Bailey and Maltzman (2011) and others find, law does matter independently
in constraining the legally and politically acceptable options that judges have before them.
Ignoring the fact that courts are legal as well as political institutions is one of Keck’s (2007a,
2007b) primary critiques of regime politics theory. However, interpretation is quite common in
the act of judging and even sincere efforts at interpretation will reflect the underlying world view
of the judge or judges making the decision. This does not mean that any outcome is possible, but
it does mean that among the legally plausible outcomes, judges will tend to select those
interpretations that are most closely aligned with how they see the world.
The fourth assumption is derived directly from the second and third. If selectors choose
judges who share their ideology and judges make decisions that are informed by their own
ideology, then it might be said that judges will decide cases in ways that are consistent with the
preferences of the regime that appointed them. This immediately runs into some complications,
however. More recent work on attitudinal decision making by judges such as Martin and Quinn
(2002) focuses on changes in ideology over time. That is, it cannot be assumed that a judge’s
ideology is fixed permanently upon appointment. It is possible that the ideology of the judge
will change over time. It is also possible that the ideology of the appointing regime will change
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over time. None of this completely undermines the assumption that judges will tend to vote in
ways consistent with their appointing regime, but it does highlight the importance of not
overstating that assumption. It is also critical to point out that this premise does not claim that
judges always vote in ways that are consistent with regime preferences. There will be deviations
from this expectation both as a result of legal constraints and as a result of disagreement within
regimes about preferences. Therefore, a more accurate description of this assumption is that
judges will tend to, when legally possible, decide cases in ways that are consistent with the clear
preferences of the regime that appointed them.
The fifth assumption is related to judicial hierarchy. The focus here is specifically on the
United States, though this assumption can be applicable to other countries with some minor
modifications. Courts within the United States operate in a nested, quasi-hierarchical manner.
This allows courts higher up in the hierarchy to overturn the decisions of courts lower in the
hierarchy and for interplay between federal and state court systems. The U.S. Supreme Court
and state supreme courts are at the top of the hierarchy depending on the subject matter of the
case. However, this hierarchical control is not perfect (McNollgast 1994; Songer, Segal, and
Cameron 1994). Often analyzed from a principal-agent perspective, research finds compliance
among federal appeals court judges with current Supreme Court majorities but not necessarily
with older precedent from majorities no longer in power (Westerland et al. 2010). This suggests
that more than just policy preferences are at play, with law exercising influence in decisionmaking (see, for example, Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2007; Scott 2006) It should be
noted, though, that very few of these studies extend further down the hierarchy than the appellate
courts (Haire, Lindquist, and Songer 2003 use appellate decisions to provide insight into federal
district court decisions) and it is even more rare to find social scientific analysis incorporating
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state courts at any level into the hierarchical approach. Most of the conclusions about the
efficacy of judicial hierarchy are drawn from cases either with enough resources to file an initial
appeal or of sufficient interest to justices on the Supreme Court to warrant granting certiorari.
This limits the confidence we can have about the dynamics of hierarchy across federal and state
systems, but the existing work is at least suggestive that there is some compliance by lower
courts, but with some remaining degree of independence as suggested by McNollgast (1994). As
a result, we should expect lower courts to continue to operate at least somewhat independently of
higher courts as long as they do not stray too far afield on issues of importance to appellate
courts. For purposes of regime politics, this means both that regime influence at the highest
levels of courts will still lead to imperfect outcomes at lower levels and that regime influence
may matter even if different regimes control higher level courts than lower level courts.
The next premise is an effort to define regimes with some more clarity than has come
before. For my purposes, the term regime here refers to a political organization that holds
political power in the relevant jurisdiction over multiple election cycles. There are four
component parts to this definition. The first is that a regime must be a political organization.
That is, it must be a group of people or an institution with an explicit purpose of using the
political system to achieve goals. This can include political parties, but they are not the only
type of political organization that is relevant. Business groups or political machines could
qualify as regimes if they meet the characteristics described. The second component is holding
political power. Power is obviously a tricky concept to specify in detail, but Moe (2005) offers
some guidance on how the concept might be made manageable. Moe highlights two ways in
which power might be exercised- agenda control and protecting the status quo- that can serve for
a rough sense of what power must be exercised in order for a regime to be present (2005, 226–
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28). The third component calls for attention to be paid to the relevant jurisdiction of the regime.
Overlapping regimes can (and do) co-exist. State-level regimes may not align with federal
regimes, but if they meet the other elements discussed, they should still be regarded as regimes.
The fourth and final component of regimes is durational. In order to be considered a regime, the
organization must wield political power over multiple election cycles. The strength of the
regime will obviously vary depending on just how many election cycles are won, but one
electoral victory does not establish a regime, nor does the loss of one election cycle necessarily
signal the end of a regime.
This is obviously not presented as the only possible way to characterize regimes, nor is it
necessarily easy to identify regimes that meet this definition. In some circumstances, political
power may exist even when electoral defeat occurs and would thus still be considered a regime.
Likewise, politically powerful, but short-lived movements may exercise real influence on the
judiciary but not be categorized as a regime. Power, in particular, may be read more broadly
than presented here. Acknowledging these critiques is not to dismiss them, but simply accept
that some choices inevitably have to be made. A relatively narrow definition of regime is
selected here, but one that will hopefully avoid creating the conclusion that regimes always win
and courts can never act independently (Keck 2007b, 533–35).
There is one final assumption to specify. The regime potentially exercising influence is
the one that controls selection of the courts within the part of the judicial hierarchy being studied.
In one sense, this is straightforward. A regime that controls a city would not exercise direct
influence over the selection of a U.S. Supreme Court justice, since they have no formal role in
that selection. This assumption, however, focuses attention not only on the de jure, but also the
de facto selection process. Control of the U.S. House of Representatives, for example, is
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unlikely to translate into much regime influence over the judiciary since selection is primarily in
the hands of the president with some influence by the Senate. The regime controlling the office
of the presidency, then, is the relevant one to consider. In the states, even though some courts
may have local elections to select judges as the de jure method, governors may routinely appoint
judges to vacancies in a way that makes the state level regime the de facto selector. Attention to
the actual exercise of power is necessary to better understand how and when regime influence
occurs.
Table 1: Regime Politics Assumptions
Assumption 1
Assumption 2
Assumption 3
Assumption 4
Assumption 5
Assumption 6
Assumption 7

Judiciary is a political institution
Selectors tend to select judges who share their ideology
Judges tend to interpret law in ways consistent with their
ideology
Judges will tend to decide cases, when legally possible, in ways
consistent with the clear preferences of appointing regime
Courts in the U.S. operate in a nested, quasi-hierarchical manner
Regimes are political organizations that hold political power in
the relevant jurisdiction over multiple election cycles
The regime exercising influence is the one that controls selection
of the courts within the part of the judicial hierarchy being
studied.

Hypotheses
From these premises, it is possible to derive a number of testable hypotheses that can
offer a richer understanding of the operation of regime politics in the judiciary. The first
hypothesis builds on the assumptions that selectors tend to choose judges who share their
ideology, that judges will decide cases in ways that reflect their own ideology, and that judges
therefore decide cases in ways consistent with their appointing regime’s clear preferences. It is
reasonable to expect regimes in power for longer periods of time to have more opportunity to
select judges. This should mean that the number of judges sharing the ideology of the
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controlling regime (and acting upon that ideology) increases as the regime remains in power.
That is, the influence that the regime has on the judiciary through the appointment of likeminded judges varies with the length of time the regime can select judges.
Hypothesis 1: Regime influence on the judiciary will increase as the length of time the regime is
in power increases.
It is important to be as clear as possible about what is meant by regime influence, since it
is a key concept in many of the subsequent hypotheses as well. Regime influence as used here
means that the regime gets the outcome they prefer in cases before the courts. Building on
Moe’s (2005) concept of power already discussed, regime influence is detectable through
decisions made by courts that either assist the regime with agenda setting or assist in maintaining
the (regime supported) status quo. Accepting this understanding of regime influence does not
mean accepting that any decision that goes the regime’s way is de facto evidence of regime
influence. It is possible that a judge acting in a legally motivated way, and therefore presumably
not influenced by the regime, may reach a conclusion that the regime prefers. Indeed, it may
well be impossible to distinguish between these motivations in all cases. By conceptualizing
regime influence in this way, though, it allows the testing of a variety of hypotheses. If these
hypotheses are supported by the evidence, then it should lead to a more confident inference that
regime influence is present. With the first hypothesis, for example, decisions favorable to the
regime may appear earlier in the regime’s lifetime, but we can have greater confidence that a
higher frequency of such decisions later in the regime’s cycle are more likely to be a
consequence of regime influence through the mechanism of judicial selection.
The second hypothesis builds on those same assumptions, but is instead focused on the
selection process. Much of the work on regime politics has focused exclusively on the U.S.
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Supreme Court, whose justices are nominated by presidents and confirmed by the Senate to what
are effectively life terms. In other courts, however, the selection process varies significantly.
Some judges are elected while some are appointed by commissions, legislatures, or executives.
The process of nomination for elections also varies from strong party control to nonpartisan
races. One advantage of expanding the application of regime politics beyond the Supreme Court
or even the federal judiciary is that institutional characteristics of the selection process can be
studied comparatively. Looking at regime politics in this way suggests that regime influence is
likely to be affected by the amount of control regime supporters have over selection.
Hypothesis 2: Regime influence on the judiciary will increase when control of selection of the
judiciary is in the hands of regime supporters.
This can be conceptualized along a sliding scale- the more direct the control, the greater
the influence. If, for example, the relevant question is when state supreme courts are subject to
regime influence, states with gubernatorial appointments are more likely to reflect influence
from the governor’s regime than those whose selection is handled by a merit selection committee
whose members are appointed by a variety of political actors. Regime influence is more likely in
elections where the regime controls whose name gets listed on the ballot. If the assumption
about appointing judges who share the regime’s ideology holds, then this increased control over
selection should translate into more favorable rulings. At the federal level, the amount of control
over selection by a regime might vary with time. At points when one political party holds
unified control of government, we should expect judges selected during this period to be most
conducive to regime influence. Under divided government, though, regime influence would be
less extensive. Scholars can characterize different jurisdictions or different historical periods as
experiencing more or less control of selection and then compare those to confirm whether regime
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influence is more or less apparent. Doing so can provide a clearer understanding of what
political conditions might lead to greater independence for judges.
Institutional control of the selection process is not the only relevant consideration,
though. Regime coherence matters as well. In any sizeable democratic political community, a
regime is likely to be a coalition whose members are not in full agreement on all matters. This
affects regime influence on the judiciary in two ways. First, when regimes are more internally
divided over critical issues, then it is reasonable to expect that the judges selected will reflect
those divisions and also act less cohesively. That is, there should be less evidence of regime
influence and more independent action. On the other hand, when ideological cohesiveness is
high within a regime, then measurable regime influence on the judiciary should also increase.
Hypothesis 3: Regime influence on the judiciary will increase as the ideological cohesiveness of
the appointing regime increases.
Ideological cohesiveness can be measured at the federal level through tools like
NOMINATE scores. Similar measures are not available in a widespread way for state and local
governments, but careful historical research can provide scholars with the means to evaluate
whether (and when) a regime is more or less ideologically cohesive. Understanding this can
better illuminate the conditions under which judges are able to act independently, the primary
issue that Keck (2007a, 2007b) was concerned regime politics failed to address.
There is a second way in which the ideology of the regime can be considered when it
comes to regime influence on the courts. Even where there are ideological differences between
regime partners, there are likely to be some issues upon which there is agreement. That is what
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holds the regime coalition together. Where regime members share common ground, so too
should judges appointed by the regime. These considerations lead to the fourth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: Regime influence on the judiciary will be most evident in subject areas of greatest
ideological agreement within the regime.
That is, we should not necessarily expect regime influence uniformly across all issue
areas addressed by courts. In those areas subject to the greatest disagreement or disinterest
within the regime, judges will be less likely to act in ways that signal regime influence. Other
influences such as law or the judge’s own ideology are more likely to impact outcomes in these
cases. Evaluating this requires assessing the core points of agreement within regimes. These
could be drawn from prominent campaign messages or from speeches while in power. For
example, though the Democratic regime of the 1930s was divided on many issues, government
involvement in economic regulation was central to how the regime formed and prospered
electorally.
Other issues where regime influence may be evident are not necessarily ideological in
character. Some court decisions can help keep regimes in power while others potentially
threaten to undermine that power. This dynamic has driven a significant part of the literature on
regime politics- it is connected fundamentally to the countermajoritarian dilemma presented by
judicial review. One response that regime politics has provided to questions about why regimes
would allow judicial review is that it is exercised when the regime thinks it is safe or desirable to
do so (e.g. Gillman 2002; Graber 1993; Whittington 2007). By moving beyond judicial review,
as suggested above, it is also possible to examine when issues may arise that are key to regime
power though less immediately visible. If a court decision or action would threaten the
continued dominance of the appointing regime, the theory predicts that judges would decide in
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ways favoring the regime, regardless of law or ideology. This is a strong version of the theory
and there are reasons to conclude that it does not capture all of the dynamics likely at play. First,
this hypothesis might only hold where regime control over the selection of judges is strong, as
laid out in Hypothesis 2. That is, where selection is entirely in the control of the regime, they
would be more likely to appoint those who feel closely connected to the regime’s interests. Even
this does not address all concerns, though. Worry about the status of the appointing regime is a
prospective consideration, not a retrospective one. Given that this hypothesis moves beyond
shared ideology as a motivation, there must be clear reasons for judges to have an interest in the
continued survival of the regime itself. Judges might be more likely to decide in this way when
it threatens not only the regime’s survival but their own continued position on the bench. Long
terms or high rates of reelection/reappointment across regime changes should insulate judges
from the pressure to protect the regime’s interests. Conversely, short terms and high turnover
would align judge’s interests with those of the regime in order to maintain power.
Hypothesis 5: Regime influence on the judiciary will be evident in ways that help the regime
maintain power regardless of ideology or law where regime control of selection is the greatest
and there are short terms on the bench.
This immediately suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court, with life terms, is one of the
courts least likely to reflect this dynamic. Though the Court may support regime interests when
ideologically aligned with the justices, they are unlikely to be focused on protecting regime
interests at the expense of the law. State courts, on the other hand, may be more likely to meet
these conditions. Fear of removal can exercise a powerful influence on how closely tied courts
are to regimes.
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The next hypothesis considers how long this influence may be expected to continue.
Regimes rise and fall over time. How long will the influence on the judiciary last after a regime
is defeated? Can the new regime begin exercising influence immediately? The answer to these
questions should rest on how quickly new regimes can replace the judges. In systems with short
terms of office, new regimes can work relatively quickly to replace judges from the previous
regime. Norms about turnover also matter in this consideration. If the norm is for judges to
remain in office largely unopposed even if the terms are short, then it will be more difficult for
the new regime to overturn the work of the regime that came before.
Hypothesis 6: The length of time that regime influence on the judiciary continues to operate
after regime defeat depends on the length of terms and turnover in office.
The period of time in which regime influence can be expected to appear in the judiciary is
not necessarily aligned perfectly with the time period during which the regime is electorally
dominant. It is a lagging indicator. Hypothesis 1 suggests that regime influence on the judiciary
will not necessarily immediately be present, while Hypothesis 6 suggests that it should continue
even after the regime suffers electoral defeat.
Because our judicial system is nested hierarchically as noted in Assumption 5, there are
two other hypotheses that ought to be considered as a part of a theory of regime politics. The
first is to evaluate which regime is the relevant regime to consider in the analysis. For the U.S.
Supreme Court, for example, is it the regime controlling a Congressional majority? Or the party
of the president? For state and local courts, the question becomes even more complex. Is the
state, county, or city level regime the relevant one to consider? Since influence on the judiciary
is predicated on influencing who sits on the bench, this is most readily answered by looking to
the regime in control of selection.
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Hypothesis 7: Regime influence will reflect the regime in control of the selection of the courts
within that part of the judicial hierarchy.
Paying attention to this dynamic can help tease out the influences of different regimes at
different levels of courts. Finding a state trial court that decided in a way that benefitted a
federal regime would not be evidence of regime influence under this theory because the federal
regime does not control selection of the state trial court judges. Likewise, a favorable U.S.
Supreme Court ruling for a city-level regime should not be interpreted as evidence of regime
influence since there is no plausible control of the selection process by that city-level regime.
This becomes particularly helpful and worth testing where there may be a distinction between de
jure and de facto selection methods. If the de jure selection method is election by county, but the
de facto selection process is gubernatorial appointment, the regime exercising influence should
be the state level one.
The final hypothesis addresses the potential interactions between regimes and between
different levels of courts. As discussed earlier, higher courts within the American court system
can exercise some measure of (imperfect) control over lower courts. Different regimes may
influence different levels of courts, particularly between state and federal courts. A federal
regime may influence federal courts but have no say in how state courts operate. A theory of
regime politics that looks beyond just the U.S. Supreme Court must account for potential
conflicts between regimes at different levels of government.
Hypothesis 8: Courts higher in the judicial hierarchy will be more likely to constrain lower level
courts when there is regime conflict between the different levels of government.
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Building off the literature discussed in Assumption 5, this hypothesis suggests that
conflict between regimes may make issues decided by lower courts important enough to
appellate courts to trigger action. If, for example, the federal regime is at odds with the state
level regime that controls judicial appointments in the state, then federal courts would be more
likely to both hear and overturn decisions of those state courts. Where regimes are in alignment,
higher level courts are less likely to get involved.
Table 2: Regime Politics Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis 6

Hypothesis 7
Hypothesis 8

Regime influence on the judiciary will increase as the length of time
the regime is in power increases.
Regime influence on the judiciary will increase when control of
selection of the judiciary is in the hands of regime supporters.
Regime influence on the judiciary will increase as the ideological
cohesiveness of the appointing regime increases.
Regime influence on the judiciary will be most evident in subject
areas of greatest ideological agreement within the regime.
Regime influence on the judiciary will be evident in ways that help
the regime maintain power regardless of ideology or law where
regime control of selection is the greatest and there are short terms
on the bench.
The length of time that regime influence on the judiciary continues
to operate after regime defeat depends on the length of terms and
turnover in office.
Regime influence will reflect the regime in control of the selection
of the courts within that part of the judicial hierarchy
Courts higher in the judicial hierarchy will be more likely to
constrain lower level courts when there is regime conflict between
the different levels of government.

Conclusion
Each of the preceding hypotheses builds on the excellent work already done on regime
politics, but seeks to clarify and specify it in ways that can further advance scholarship.
Consideration of these dynamics offers a richer understanding of how regime politics and the
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judiciary interact. The next step, of course, is to put these hypotheses to the test. How do they
perform? Do the federalism decisions from the Rehnquist Court support the regime politics
theory of Pickerill and Clayton (2004)? Did the courts of Daley-era Chicago offer evidence of
regime influence? A first glance suggests that in these cases, at least, the hypotheses of regime
politics have some weight to them.
For the federalism cases from 1992-2004, the increased ideological cohesiveness of the
Republican party (Hypothesis 3) combined with lengthy control of the office of the presidency
by Republicans (Hypothesis 2) made regime influence more likely. Pickerill and Clayton (2004)
present evidence of the centrality of federalism to the Republican coalition, making it an area of
significant ideological agreement within the coalition (Hypothesis 4). As a consequence, this is
an area where we would expect to see regime influence emerge. However, that influence will be
constrained by the long terms served by the justices and Democratic control of the Senate for
large swaths of time (Hypothesis 5). Even this brief foray into the subject suggests the potential
for a more nuanced and richer understanding of just how regimes matter for the judiciary than
earlier work.
Moving beyond the U.S. Supreme Court, the courts of Cook County in Illinois appear to
fit with these hypotheses as well. The long mayoral reign of Richard J. Daley from 1955 to 1976
was combined with control of the Cook County Democratic Central Committee resulting in
widespread power and influence (Hypothesis 1). Daley’s role in approving candidate names on
the Democratic ballots meant that even though he did not have a formal role in the selection of
judges, his informal role was tremendously important (Royko 1971, 64; Tuohy and Warden
1989, 45–46) and thus supports Hypothesis 2. Judges in Cook County served relatively short
terms while the regime exercised significant control over the selection process. Given those
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dynamics, it is not a surprise to see circumstances where these courts acted to advance the
interests of the regime, such as protecting regime supporters through refusing to sign the formal
presentment from a grand jury (Biles 1995, 179–80). This is consistent with Hypothesis 5. And
the increasing divide between the federal government’s priority of racial inclusiveness and
Daley’s continued segregation meant that federal courts stepped in on a number of occasions,
most prominently with the Shakman Decrees, to limit and restrict the flexibility of the Daley
regime (Hypothesis 8). Though further work is of course necessary to compellingly test these
hypotheses in action, even the cursory review presented here is sufficient to highlight the ways in
which thinking about courts in this way can help reformulate and redirect the questions we ask
about regime politics.
In both of these cases, the theory of regime politics does not predict unrestrained regime
influence in the judiciary. The influence that occurs is contextual and moderated by other
political factors. This is the promise of regime politics as a lens for understanding the judiciarya way to combine the insight that politics matters for the judiciary with a nuanced and balanced
understanding of how and when those politics actually come into play. With the more clearly
defined and developed theory of regime politics presented here, scholars can now use this to
advance our understanding of the intersection of law and politics.
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